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Author's response
Dr. Blomfield's review of my Freud Evuluured : The Completed Arc raises a number of central issues and I am pleased to have the opportunity of responding to it. His evaluation is, of course, very critical but I am as gratified that he thinks it "offers a valuable source not easily found elsewhere" as I am pleased with his overall, if qualified, judgement that it "is well worth reading" both for its "immense amount of valuable historical detail" and its "challenging, even when mistaken, views." The issues on which Dr. Blomfield and I disagree are of three types: a fundamental and probably unresolvable difference of position, resolvable (or at least arguable) differences over what Freud said or meant about a number of major issues, and similar differences over the nature of historicallybased criticism.
Our fundamental difference is over the nature of psychoanalysis. Dr. Blomfield interprets it as an hermeneutic discipline while I, in keeping with Freud's view, see psychoanalysis as a natural science. Chapter 16, especially pages 578-58 I , contains what I believe is an exhaustive list ofthe places where Freud discus-ses, argues for, or asserts his view. For example, as late as his posthumously published papers of 1940 he argued that no special place had to be found for psychoanalysis because "Psychology too is a natural science. What else can it be?" (p.580). Gaps in psychoanalytic observations were filled by the same kinds of interpolations as physicists made in "completing" their observations, and its theories had the same realist aims (ibid.). Further, by saying there were no sources of knowledge derived from "revelation, intuition, or divination" (p.S79), Freud implicitly rejected what Dr. Blomfield calls a "humanistic epistemology" in favour of a "naive positivistic psychology". Even though this difference is probably not resolvable, I make four points about it. First, is Freud's consistent representation of psychoanalysis as a natural science and of himself as a natural scientist to be set aside as the record of a self-delusion'? Second, if the many powerful philosophical arguments against the cause-motive-reason distinction cannot be rebutted (pp. S86-598) , what then of humanistic epistemology? (Incidentally, I think it unreasonable to characterise the conclusion from these arguments that the distinction is "groundless" as a mere "claim" or "assertion" ). Third, what counters do Freud's humanistic interpreters have to the problems of "understanding'' and narrative based explanations (pp.582-586) ? Fourth, what are the solutions to the related hermeneutic problems of indeterminacy of readings or of closing the circle and the impossibility of a developmental psychology (pp.600-608)?
Suggestion is the first of the main resolvable issues over which Dr. Blomfield and I differ. Some aspects of my position need clarifying. If by the "effects" of suggestion Dr. Blomfield means "therapeutic effects", the "central critical issue" for me is not at all that "the effects, if any, of psychoanalysis are due to "suggestion" but that "suggestion" so contaminates data obtained by free association in the therapeutic situation that no valid theory of personality can be fashioned out of them. I am not much interested in therapeutic efficts because (a) there is so little evidence about the effects of psychoanalytic therapy (pp.542-547), (b) such effects play a very problematic role in validating any theory from which a therapy derives (pp.547-548), and (c) they are not understood by anybody, including psychoanalysts (pp.607-608).
Despite Dr. Blomfield's complaint, I do not regard the "suggestion" in the complex situation represented in Brouillet's Une l e p n clinique a la SalpEtrie're as "a single intrusive factor" or as deriving solely from Richer's drawing hanging on the wall of the lecture theatre. In fact, after pointing out that Richer's depiction of the arc-de-cercle provides only one of many ways through which Charcot's hysterical patients could have acquired knowledge of what was expected of them during a typical Salpe^trie're attack (p.70), I go on to discuss how the determination of hysterical symptoms by ideas means that, even without modelling, symptoms must be uniform from culture to culture, epoch to epoch, and patient to patient (pp.7 1-72). All this is consistent with my earlier illustrations of expectations and demand characteristics as determinants of hypnotic and hysterical phenomena (Chapters 1-3). Richer's drawing is certainly not a "single link" providing a "key" to unlock the meaning of the event. However, in view of the profound disagreements among psychoanalysts about the meanings of such concepts as identification, projection, and narcissism (pp.359-363, 475-476, 482-489, 5 16-520) , I would be much more wary than Dr. Blomfield of using them to explain Charcot and his audience, even in the unlikely event of becoming inclined to make that attempt.
Dr. Blomfield misreads the term "demand chardcteristics" as if it were the Gestalt term "demand character.'' While the latter refers to the need-inducing properties of objects (e.g. a good meal "demands" to be eaten), the former derives from Ome's identification of the tendency for subjects in all psychological investigations to behave in accord with what they construe as the demands of the hypotheses under test. "Demand characteristics" therefore refers to active processes within the subject which seek, albeit unconsciously, to align his or her behaviour with the therapists' expectations. Ome's term is therefore particularly apposite to discussions of the behaviour of Freud's "subjects". In relation to psychoanalytic theory, two rather more substantial points can be made about suggestion. First, even if the data were obtained by free association not hopelessly contaminated by suggestion, the logic by which Freud evaluates putative causes is faulty. As I pointed out in 1974, and repeat in Chapter 5, Freud's evaluative tool was a defective adaptation of Koch's postulates, built on a confusion of necessary with necessary and sufficient conditions. Griinbaum similarly pointed out the inadequacies of Breuer's and Freud's criteria for ruling out the effects of "suggestion" in their therapy and brought out other inadequacies of Freud's analysis of causes. Both of our arguments apply equally to meaning-type interpretations of cause and make it difficult to accept psychoanalytic data derived from changes in therapy as a basis for theory building, whether contaminated by "suggestion" or not. Second, only "suggestion" seems to account for the singular fact of many variant psychoanalytical theories claiming to be based on Freud's method. They cannot just be due to analysts selectively drawing on or selectively interpreting a common pool of data because, were that the case, difficulties in choosing between them could be resolved on the basis of "facts", at least in principle. That not being possible, the variants must be largely due to free association creating variant sets of data Free association is the second of the main resolvable issues. Freud held three natural-science beliefs about his method: it was objective, it revealed causes, and causes were the same as reasons. First, free association was as objective a method as microscopy [ 11; only in a limited sense could the expectations of the analyst (pp.570-574) .
determine what the patient retrieved (p.55 1). A necessary consequence of this belief is that one has to ask about the reliability and validity of the method. Do different analysts make the same observations and draw the same conclusions? It is here that Jung's studies of word-association and the issue of "translation" are relevant.
Word associations in experiments are, of course, different from free associations in therapy, but it was Freud who appealed to the former as validating the latter (p.552). My examining of Jung's studies was therefore not based on any "wilful conflation" of the two kinds of association; nor did it have the "intentional" design of creating "confusion" or scoring "debating-sty1e"points. Jung's studies, it turns out, are totally irrelevant to the issue of whether free associations in the therapeutic situation are determined solely or mainly by the patient's unconscious mental processes I used "translation", as did Freud, to refer to the process by which separate elements of a dream or symptom complex are given meaning. Whereas he asserted that there was a similarity between what psychoanalysts do in deciphering and translating "unknown" behaviours and what language specialists do with unknown languages, I find the analogy fatally flawed: no unknown language has ever been deciphered without some knowledge of its relation to an already known written or spoken language (loosely, a "second script"). However, the second script of the latent content of the dream, symptom, or parapraxis does not exist apart from the particular act of translation which creates both its vocabulary and its grammatical rules. Freud's implication, that psychoanalysts could be as good at their translation as tests had shown language specialists to be with cuneiform, was therefore a completely false one (pp.556-560). This basic indeterminacy in the use of material recovered by free association shows why analysts have failed so abysmally on those few tests which have been conducted on their ability to agree on interpretations. My argument has nothing whatever to do with the nomotheticidiographic distinctionit simply examines a central claim of Freud's. (It also tells us why "resistances and transference/counter transference implications" cannot be "the data" -they, too, are interpretations).
Nor was there any confusion in my saying that Laplanche and Pontalis erred in describing free association as one of three methods. They say that "only gradually" did free association come "to appear fun-(pp.552-553).
damental", before adding that it was originally of "equal stature" with the interpretation of dreams and parapraxes as one of "three possible ways of reaching the unconscious" [2]. I must also dispute Dr. Blomfield's argument that I "inappropriately" based what I said about Freud's technique on "a transient component" of it. For example: even in his very last works, Freud insisted that the interpretation of a dream started from the free associations to its elements [3, 4] . In his quotations, Dr. Blomfield misses Freud's emphasis on a starting point [5] and that, even without one, whatever the patient says is controlled by and has reference to the analytic situation [6].
Freud's second belief was that free association helped fill the gaps in the patient's "story" so that the causes of his or her behaviour (including dreams and symptoms) could eventually be reconstructed. Apparently uncaused or irrational and meaningless behaviour was thereby given meaning, especially by its usually being placed in a larger developmental framework that makes patent the whole causal structure of the behaviour. Implicit here is the third belief causes can be equated with reasons and motives. As to this belief, not only do I set out philosophical and logical arguments for it, but I give a selection of Freud's explanations where he makes the equation explicit (pp.592-595).
Freud's three beliefs have the necessary consequence that his psychoanalysis is (potentially) a genetic or developmental psychology. By offering explanations of the genesis of symptoms, the sexual life of the child, and the growth of adult characteristics from their infantile forms, Freud's psychoanalysis is about the development of real people in the real world (pp.590-59 1) and not simply about what is created verbally in therapy, as Ricoeur would have it. This outcome again raises the validity of the method and of the theories based on it. I would emphasise that these are legitimate questions even though all scientific observations are prone to error and all scientific theories only relatively true (i.e. relatively valid).
Dr. Blomfield and I also have different conceptions of what my book is about. It is not an historical account but an historically-based critique and the word "evaluated" was not used idly. I do not stop once background facts have been recited, the chronological sequence of events reconstructed, or lines of influence traced, but try to estimate the effects of such matters on Freud's conceptualisations. As two related instances, consider the assumptions on which free associa-tion is based and the creation of data via expectations and demand characteristics.
Freud believed in the objectivity of free association partly because of the physiological associationism of Meynert -Freud's neurohistological and psychiatric mentor. According to Meynert, associations starting from one idea could only terminate in another because it had previously been connected to it by simultaneous or successive experience causing both to be excited physiologically simultaneously or successively. Because a train of associations could not be derailed by external influence, I have called this kind of determinism "internal". But there is another source: Charcot also rejected external factors as determinants of hypnosis and hysteria. When Freud's interest in psychological phenomena was aroused at the Salpe^triPre, he was already primed by Meynert's internalist view of determinism to accept Charcot's.
Here is the critical relevance of Delboeuf's reaction to Charcot's work on hypnosis (and Dr. Blomfield's minor error about it is worth correcting). Delboeuf visited the Sulpe^trikr.e at the same time as Freud but reacted sceptically to the demonstrations of regularity in the hypnotic stages and the experiments using magnets to "transfer" symptoms from one part of the body to another. After training his own subjects to display the stages, his critique forced concessions from Binet in 1886 (and a total surrender in 1892) as well as a capitulation from Janet in 19 19. Throughout this battle and long afterwards, Freud remained in the trenches, practically the only defender of Charcot's position that hypnotic and hysterical phenomena were produced by internal, physiological-like determinants.
My purpose in citing part of Freud's Preface to his translation of Bernheim (p.72) was therefore to convey only his defence of Charcot and not at all to introduce an "open and balanced" discussion of the nature of hypnotic influence itself. My comment immediately after that quotation ("Freud was to be as wrong about hysteria as he was about hypnosis") was meant as a critical summary of the arguments set out in Chapters 1-3 concerning Freud's disregard of expectations and demand characteristics and to foreshadow part of the conclusions to Chapters 4, 5, and 8, especially about Freud's errors over the causes of hysteria. Since the point of my book was to.provide an historically-based critique, Dr. Blomfield's characterising my comment as a "sudden attack" suggests that he missed it.
I make a similar response to Dr. Blomfield's classing similar critical conclusions as either "mesmeric"
and "dutiful polemic[s]" springing from my suddenly recollecting that I am "supposed to be knocking Freud" or as "awkward additions" having "a problematical connection with the previous text." These critical nodes do not derive from my "ambivalent relationship to Freud" (diagnosed at long distance) generating a need to "sideswipe" Freud and others (e.g. Fechner, Spencer, Darwin). It would have been more informative had Dr. Blomfield pointed out where my conclusions were in error, especially as I was led to many of them through the work of proper psychoanalytic historians, such as Ritvo on Darwin and counterwill.
Four final points: Dr. Blomfield makes no assessment of my examination of Freud's theoretical constructs or the (equally unsatisfactory) amendments proposed by Freud's successors. I grant that in the very narrow sense such examination may be stood apart from the historical critique but, from my point of view (and that of the reader), I would have liked some opinion on the general endeavour. Were Karl Popper and Henry Ford right when they saidadmittedly in slightly different ways -"History is bunk"? Second, Strachey 's introduction to the Studies on hysteria does not and could not cover the later affective interpretation of Anna 0. because the essential evidence -Breuer's case noteswere not discovered until well after it was written. Third, and similarly, while Laplanche and Pontalis do discuss constancy and related principles, it is also only in Freud Evaluared that the logical structure of Breuer's and Freud's early theory of the neuroses is set out. Lastly, because potential readers may be frightened off, let me deny that Freud Evaluared was formed from my lecture notes being "collated and organised." I hope that it is neither as dull as most such products nor reads as poorly as them.
